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Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC
KAL RAUSTIALA*

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) helped
usher in the contemporary "trade and environment" era. In an effort to
assuage environmental organizations that feared NAFTA's impact on
the North American environment, the United States, Canada, and

Mexico negotiated the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC). l This Article explores a key aspect of the
NAAEC: its provisions for the review of domestic environmental law
enforcement via citizen submissions.
Treaty review is a critical issue because collective action problems
plague both trade and environmental agreements. While the parties to
these accords evidently desire cooperation, they face incentives to

renege or behave opportunistically with regard to their international
commitments. Consequently, many contemporary treaties create a
system for monitoring state performance. I call these systems review
treaty
review
institutions
typically
Review
institutions.2
implementation, but they may also review treaty compliance or even
treaty effectiveness.

Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC, commonly known as the
Citizen Submissions Process, are an example of a review institution.
The Citizen Submissions Process permits any individual or group in
* Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School. I thank Stuart Banner, Larry Helfer, John
Knox, Dave Markell, and Jody Freeman for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Kal Raustiala,
Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 256 (David L. Markell & John H.

Knox eds., 2003) (providing an earlier version of this article).
1. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, art. 1, 32
I.L.M. 1480, 1483 [hereinafter NAAEC]; John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE
NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 256, 256 (David L.

Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
2. In previous work with David Victor and Eugene Skohlikoff we use the phrase "systems
for implementation review." THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
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Canada, Mexico, or the United States to allege that one of these states is
failing to effectively enforce a domestic environmental law.3 If
successful, a citizen submission can compel a response from the party in
question and lead to the publication, by the NAAEC Secretariat, of a
"factual record" of the situation.4 The procedure's aim is to ensure that
the NAFTA parties, and their political subunits, such as provinces and
municipalities, effectively enforce their environmental laws. The
political subtext that led to the procedure's creation was the fear that
liberalized trade under NAFTA would produce pressures
to lower
5
domestic environmental standards and weaken enforcement.
In this Article I argue that we can usefully distinguish two6
fundamental modes of treaty review: "police patrols" and "fire alarms."
Rather than rely solely on investigative "police patrols" by a centralized
bureaucracy, the NAAEC creates a "fire alarm" which permits private
actors to trigger an investigation by the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) when they allege that a NAFTA party is failing to
uphold its treaty obligations. The police patrol-fire alarm dichotomy
highlights a central issue in treaty design: the provision of compliancerelevant information. The distinction between the two modes of review
is fundamentally about the source of treaty-relevant information, not
about what happens after that information is gathered (such as the
choice to impose sanctions or provide assistance). Most scholarly
literature addressing compliance with international agreements focuses
on what happens after detection of a treaty violation. This article
focuses on a prior question-the method that reveals such information.
The use of fire alarms in treaty review, while not unknown, is unusual;
international law rarely permits private actors to challenge states. As a

3. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14, 32 I.L.M at 1488.
4. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14 & 15, at 1488-89.
5. Betty Ferber et al., Building an Environmental Protection Framework for North
America: The Role of the Non-Governmental Community, in GREEN GLOBE YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 83, 83 (Helge Ole
Bergesen et al., eds., 1995); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT
AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 111-12

(1996) (indicating that this fear was particularly salient for Mexico).
6. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrolsversus Fire Alarm, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 (1984).
7. The major exception is bilateral investment treaties, which commonly permit private
actors to challenge state actions. In multilateral accords of any kind, however, such access is rare.
(See Kenneth J. Vanvelde, US Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L. L. 621, 655-59 (1993).) See generally THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 16 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) (discussing that private actors also
have standing to challenge state parties in some international human rights accords).
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result, the choice to employ a fire alarm structure in the NAAEC raises

two important questions. First, why, and under what conditions, do
states choose to rely on fire alarms, police patrols, or some combination

when designing treaty review institutions? Second, what outcomes flow
from this choice?
The focus of this Article is primarily on the second question-the
implications of empowering private actors in treaty review. I argue that
under the NAAEC, the creation of a fire alarm yields important positive

and normative benefits. However, I do not claim that the anticipation of
these benefits explains the decision to create a fire alarm in this case.
Prevailing rational design theories suggest that the functional benefits

that flow from international institutions largely explain states' choices
of treaty design. 8 In other words, rational design theorists claim that
"design differences [in treaties] are not random. They are the result of
states and other international
rational, purposive interactions among
9
problems."
specific
actors to solve
This Article explores the relative strength of rational design theory.

I argue that it is liberal international relations theory, rather than rational
design theory, that best explains the choice of review institution in the

NAAEC. Liberal theory looks to the configuration of actors and
institutions at the domestic level to explain international outcomes.' 0
Only by understanding the domestic actors' interests, and the
institutions that aggregate and often refract those interests, can we
understand the preferences of states, and hence the observed outcomes

that are embodied in legal provisions. As the Article will show, the
Citizen Submissions Process was created because of political pressure
8. Barbara Koremenos etal., The Rational Design of InternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'L
ORG. 761, 762 (2001). Functional theories evaluate causes in terms of effects. As Robert
Keohane argues, "Functional explanations in social theory are generally post hoc in nature. We
observe such institutions and then rationalize their existence. Rational-choice theory, as applied
to social institutions, assumes that institutions can be accounted for by examining the incentives
facing the actors who created and maintained them. Institutions exist because they could have
reasonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators." ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,
AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 80
(1984).
9. Koremenos, supra note 8,at 762.
10. See Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter'sLiberal
Theory, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 183, 183 (2001); Edward D. Mansfield et al., Why Democracies
CooperateMore: Electoral Control and InternationalTrade Agreements, 56 INT'L ORG. 477, 479
(2002); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 516 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International
Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 49
WORLD POL. 482, 483-83 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR.J INT'L L. 503, 508 (1995).
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from U.S. environmental organizations. These organizations' power
was enhanced by the fact that NAFTA was passed as a congressionalexecutive agreement, subject to a straight majority vote in both houses
of Congress, rather than an Article II treaty. 1 Nonetheless, the benefits
of a fire alarm may encourage states to employ them more often. This
may occur after states learn which review institutions work best in
differing contexts, and as political barriers to fire alarms, based largely
on concerns about sovereignty, are weakened.
The benefits that flow from the creation of a fire alarm fall into
three categories: effectiveness, efficiency, and participatory governance.
Because the NAAEC citizen submissions process involves the citizenry
of the NAFTA parties, it draws on the abundant private information
about environmental enforcement individuals possess. This makes it
more effective than a pure police patrol system. It is also likely that, in
the context of the NAAEC, a fire alarm is more efficient than a police
patrol model. Further, since fire alarm review directly involves
individuals, it upholds, however weakly, normative values concerning
participatory democracy.' 2 While the Citizen Submissions Process is a
small step in this regard, it does enhance participation in international
economic liberalization, which is an increasingly important issue as3
popular protests mount over the rising role of international institutions.'
From a domestic law perspective the NAAEC's review provisions are
feeble. But in the context of international law, they are ground-breaking.
By creating a direct role for individuals, the submissions process
challenges the state-centric orientation of international law.
Part I of this Article elaborates the police patrol-fire alarm
dichotomy. Part II describes the details of the NAAEC procedure. Part
III illustrates how the police patrol-fire alarm distinction applies to the

11. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (providing that an Article II treaty is subject to a twothirds passage in the Senate). Made in the USA v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1228
(1999) (litigating the issue of whether NAFTA, as a treaty passed by Congress as a fast track
legislation pursuant to the exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, required
a two-thirds vote by the Senate under the Treaty Clause); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L.
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS 409 (2003).
12. See Barton Thompson Jr., The ContinuingInnovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 185, 223-26 (arguing that the citizen suit, from which the NAAEC process is broadly
derived, bolsters democratic values in a similar fashion).
13. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 597 (1999). The
democratic deficit in international institutions is much lamented and commented upon. See id.;
Symposium, Trends in Global Governance: Do They Threaten American Sovereignty?, I U. CHI.
J. INT'L L. 205 (2000); David Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International
Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REv. 769 (1994).
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NAAEC. It explains the choice of a fire alarm, describes the advantages
of fire alarms, and argues for its significance as a component of
institutional design. Finally, Part IV concludes that review institutions
play an important role in promoting treaty implementation, monitoring
performance, and ensuring that states comply with their treaty
obligations. Additionally, it concludes that there are compelling reasons
to believe that fire alarm review institutions have significant advantages
in the context of North American environmental cooperation.
I. Two MODELS OF TREATY REVIEW

Treaty review institutions gather, assess, and take decisions based
on information relevant to the implementation of, compliance with, and
effectiveness of commitments in international agreements. 14 While
empirical studies are few, many treaties appear to contain no review
provisions whatsoever, whereas a few employ elaborate, variegated
review institutions. In the study of American politics, scholars of the
congressional oversight of administrative bureaucracies argue that two
basic models of review exist: police patrols and fire alarms. 15 Police
patrols encompass efforts by centralized authorities (in the
congressional context - committees) to actively and systematically
search for problems or violations through hearings, audits, and
inspections. By contrast, private actors trigger fire alarms, which signal
that there has been a violation or problem. Like real fire alarms, these
reactive and decentralized procedures rely on individual stakeholders
with economic or political incentives to pursue such claims.
The core distinction between police patrols and fire alarms is
whether the system of review relies upon central authorities to search
for and reveal information about performance, or whether it delegates
that role to other actors. The NAAEC's review institution, which
empowers private actors to question state performance, is an example of
a fire alarm. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which permits a
central authority to inspect and review state performance, is an example
of a police patrol. 16 The central authority bears the costs of searching for
noncompliance. By contrast, fire alarms shift costs away from

14.

KAL RAUSTIALA,

REPORTING AND

REVIEW INSTITUTIONS IN

10 MULTILATERAL

ENVIRONMENT 3 (2001), availableat http://www.unep.org/GEO/techreports.hm.

15. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 165.
16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-21, 32
I.L.M. 800 (1993).
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governments and international organizations, to individuals and other
private actors.
These two models represent distinct but not mutually exclusive
institutional strategies. Review institutions often blend elements of both
police patrols and fire alarms. 17 Review institutions may also eschew
both models; that is, the review institution may rely only on selfreporting by parties to the treaty, or there may be no reporting or review
at all. In many treaties, states prefer no performance review because the
treaty addresses a coordination problem (and hence is basically selfenforcing), because the agreement is largely symbolic, or because the
states involved fear "relinquishing sovereignty," in the sense of
relinquishing autonomy and control. 18 When states do create treaty
review institutions, they often shun fire alarms. Empowering private
actors unleashes processes that are difficult for governments to control.
The police patrol-fire alarm dichotomy refers to the manner in
which treaty-relevant information is gathered and signaled, not the
response to that information. Responses vary independently of the mode
of the review. In the context of international treaties, responses to
noncompliance typically range from mild shaming strategies to
authorized trade sanctions. In addition, in domestic legal systems
legislators create laws that apply primarily to other actors. The
international system, by contrast, typically creates legal obligations
through treaties, which by definition apply to States' own behavior. In
this sense treaties are more like contracts than statutes. As a result,
states face incentives both to review the performance of other states and
to behave opportunistically. These sometimes conflicting incentives,
coupled with sovereignty concerns over fire alarms, explain why treaty
review is so weak compared to congressional oversight.' 9
II. THE NAAEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS

The NAAEC aims to enhance environmental protection in North
America and increase cooperation among the NAFTA parties.
Environmental organizations, particularly in the United States, had two
chief fears about NAFTA. First, they feared that the increased trade
produced by NAFTA would exacerbate environmental problems in the
17. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 13, at 1487-88. Under the NAAEC, for example, the CEC
Secretariat can initiate studies under its own initiative on a wide range of topics. Id.
18. See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in InternationalEconomic Law, 6
J. INT'L ECON. L. 841 (2004) (discussing the sovereignty issue).
19. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002).
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border regions. Second, and more importantly, they feared the effects on

environmental protection. Many environmentalists believe that trade
liberalization undermines environmental protection not only in terms of
a race to the bottom in regulatory standards, but also in a race-to-thebottom in implementation and enforcement. 20 This concern was
particularly salient in NAFTA because Mexican environmental law,
while formally strict, was poorly enforced. 21 Relatively tepid
congressional support for NAFTA in the early 1990s enabled
environmental groups to successfully demand that the Clinton
Administration address this alleged race-to-the-bottom problem.22 The
Clinton Administration pressed for the creation of the NAAEC because

it was concerned that NAFTA would not pass if environmentalists
opposed it. 23 Canada and Mexico ultimately accepted this addition as
the price of NAFTA. 2 4 As a result, the NAAEC was negotiated with the

core objective of "improv[ing] environmental laws, regulations,
procedures, policies, and practices" and enhancing "compliance with,
and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations. 25
The NAAEC Citizen Submissions Process, which in many ways is
the agreement's centerpiece, permits any individual or nongovernmental

organization (NGO) residing in the territory of the three parties to file a
submission with the Secretariat of the CEC alleging that a party is
"failing to effectively enforce its environmental law[s]. 26 Citizen suit
procedures found in some U.S. statutes are a loose model for the
NAAEC Citizen Submissions Process.27 This provision is unique in

20. Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the
Bottom'Rationalefor FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992);
Kristin Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the
Bottom "?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 (1997) (exploring the race to the bottom notion).
21. BNA, North American Free TradeAgreement Greeted with Suspicion by Environmental
Groups, 15 INT'L ENV'T REP. 561, 562. The U.S. General Accounting Office conducted a study
See GAO, US-MEXICAN TRADE:
of Mexican law that significantly fed this concern.
INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT, No. GAO/NSIAD-91227 (May 1991).
22. Green Groups Press Kantorfor Powerful NAFTA Environmental Commission, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 5, 1993, http://www.insidetrade.com. The U.S. Trade Representative had
already been pressured into preparing a report on the environmental issues. USTR, REVIEW OF
US-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Feb. 1992).
23. See Keith Bradsher, The Free Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at 14.
24. See Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free TradeAgreement: Green Law or Green
Spin?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1,1 (1994).
25. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1483.
26. Id. art. 14, at 1488.
27. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2001); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2001);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2001); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
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international environmental law because it focuses not on the
enforcement of internationallaw, but rather on that of domestic law. In
this sense the NAAEC creates a means for the international
"enforcement of enforcement. ' 8 There are minor threshold
requirements submitters must meet but, interestingly, submitters need
not reside in or be a citizen of the party whose enforcement practices
they challenge. 29 Thus the process is truly transnational: Mexican NGOs
can complain about enforcement failures in Nova Scotia, and, what was
critical from the political perspective of securing the overall NAFTA
package, U.S. NGOs can complain about enforcement failures in
Tijuana. 30
When a private individual makes a submission, the Secretariat
determines whether to request a response from the challenged party.31
After receiving the government's reply, the Secretariat then decides
whether to recommend the creation of a "factual record. 32 The
environment ministers of the three NAFTA parties (the Council), must
approve the decision by a two-thirds vote.3 3 When the factual record is
complete, the Council votes again on its public release.34 Since the
inception of the process in 1995, the Secretariat has received forty-three
submissions, 35 and has completed nine factual records. 36 These factual

2619 (2001); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, Title II § 215, 93 Stat.
1014 (198 1) (incorporating Citizen suits into legislative acts). The Clean Air Act states:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1) against any person
(including (i) the United States and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or
agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged... to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter
or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation.
42 U.S.C. § 7604.
28. See generally Kal Raustiala, International 'Enforcement of Enforcement' Under the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721 (1996).
29. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14, at 1488.
30. See Comit6 Ciudadano Pro Restauraci6n del Canon del Padre Y Servicios Comunitarios,
A.C. and Environmental Health Coalition, Petition Before the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Under Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement for Environmental
Cooperation, Metales y Derivados, A14/SEM/98-007/01/SUB, (CEC Oct. 23, 1998) (SEM 98007), available at http://www.cec.org/files /PDF/SEM/98-7-SUB-OE.pdf [hereinafter Metales y
Derivados].
31. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14, at 1488.
32. Id. art. 15, at 1488-89.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, available at www.cec.org/citizen/
index.cfm?varlan english (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
36. Id.
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records are comprehensive but generally neutral in tone; indeed, a
recurring critique of the current procedure is that the Secretariat may not
make any explicit recommendations, nor does it have the power to reach
affirmative conclusions as to whether37the party in question is in fact
"failing to effectively enforce" its law.
The NAAEC Citizen Submissions Process is, as a result, primarily
an information-forcing mechanism. There are no direct sanctions
employed; rather, the NAAEC employs a regulatory strategy. of
"sunshine. 3 8 By forcing parties to respond to complaints, and through
the creation of factual records, the procedure generates information

about environmental enforcement. It forces states to explain, and to give
reasons for, their conduct and administrative choices.
From an administrative law perspective, the lack of a meaningful

remedy and the low number of submissions (about five a year) might
suggest that the significance of the NAAEC process is minimal. 39 But

when viewed in the context of international law the procedure is highly
unusual. It both addresses domestic legal enforcement through an
international agreement, and it empowers individuals, even those from
other jurisdictions, to bring claims against a sovereign state. In this
sense, the NAAEC Citizen Submissions Process is an example of
"complaint-based monitoring '4° and while it is not a form of
supranational adjudication, it shares some important characteristics of
such adjudication.41

37. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 15, at 1488-89. See generally JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY
COMMITTEE [JPAC], 'CEC, LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES 14
AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, FINAL
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (June 6,

2001), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/rep I 1-e-fmaLEN.PDF (reviewing and reporting on the
lessons learned from the public history of citizen submissions under Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC).
38. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing
Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 511, 543 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.

Jacobson eds., 1998) "Sunshine methods are intended to bring the behavior of parties and targeted
actors into the open for appropriate scrutiny, and thereby to encourage compliance." Id.

39. It is clear that the rate of factual record production is going up, and indeed this year for
the first time the Secretariat sought summer law interns to assist in the citizen submissions

process. (Personal communication from Geoff Garver, CEC Secretariat, to author.)
40. John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental Law:
The Submissions Procedureof the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 11
(2001).
41. See generally Laurence Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (providing additional information on

supranational adjudication).
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The empirical impact of the submissions process remains unclear.
In the Cozumel Pier case, the submitters deemed their effort a success.4 2
Other observers agree, arguing that due to the factual record "in
Cozumel... the reef is now declared as a protected area, the
development project was downsized, there have been legal changes[,]
and a management plan is in place. ' 43 In the BC Hydro case, local
NGOs claim that commitments made by Canada in response to their
submission, and recorded in the factual record, have "proven extremely
valuable .... Those commitments have become a very potent tool for
us."4 With only a few years of operation, it is too soon to convincingly

gauge the effectiveness of the submissions process. Perhaps the best
evidence to date on this question is the reaction of the NAFTA parties
themselves. In 2000 the parties, apparently led by Canada and Mexico,
considered curtailing the submissions process but backed off under
NGO pressure. Nonetheless, recent actions and resolutions of the
NAFTA parties circumscribe the process in potentially significant ways,
45
ways that may go beyond the permissible bounds set by the treaty text.
If the NAAEC submissions process was truly toothless, these efforts,
which have been the subject of considerable controversy, would not
make sense.
III. TREATY REVIEW IN THE NAAEC

The NAAEC submissions process, like all fire alarms, shifts the
search for noncompliance away from central actors (such as government
officials or international organizations) and toward private actors. My
primary argument in this Article is that the choice to create a fire alarm
review institution yields certain benefits, but also creates problems and
risks. My aim is to detail these benefits and costs. By highlighting the
outcomes that flow from one or the other model, the police patrol-fire
alarm typology also provides a potential explanation of the choice of
review institution in the NAAEC: rational states designed the optimal
system for gathering information about compliance with the NAAEC

42. See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SEVEN YEARS
LATER 34 (Institute for International Economics 2000).
43. JPAC, Summary Record, Sess. No. 02-01, Mexico City, Mexico, Mar. 8, 2002, at 4,
J/02-01/SR/Rev. 1, at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/sr02-Ole-fm.pdf.
44. Citizen Submission Proves Valuable in BC Hydro Case, TRIO, Fall 2001, available at
http://www.cec.org/trio/stories/index.c fm?ed=5&ID=70&varlan=english.
45. See David L. Markell, The CEC Citizens Submission Process: On or Off Course?, in
GREENING NAFTA, supra note 1, at 286, 274-89.
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and NAFTA's environmental
explanation persuasive?

standards. Is this

rational

design

A. Explainingthe Choice of a FireAlarm
This rational explanation, while consistent with prevailing theories
of design in international relations, does not fit the empirical record
well. There is little evidence that the NAFTA parties sought to create a
fire alarm as the optimal institution to deter and reveal violations of
international commitments. Rather, liberal international relations theory,
with its focus on domestic interest groups and domestic institutions, best
explains why the NAAEC featured such a novel review institution.
Consider first the differing reactions of the parties to the original
NAAEC proposal. The United States, under the first Bush
Administration, provided the idea of incorporating environmental
concerns into NAFTA after key members of Congress, spurred by
environmental groups, threatened to derail fast-track negotiating
authority. 46 After NAFTA was concluded and the U.S. presidency
changed, then President Clinton demanded new negotiations over a side
agreement under continuing domestic pressure. While Canada and
Mexico initially accepted the need for some regional environmental
cooperation, they opposed the U.S. proposal to create the NAAEC and
they were ultimately successful in modifying and weakening it,
particularly its fire alarm feature.4 7 Neither state sought this design
feature and they clearly would have rejected it, but for the
overwhelming economic power of the United States. Moreover, the
United States' interest in creating the NAAEC was largely a function of
domestic political pressure and the peculiarities of the U.S.
constitutional order. But whatever the cause of the U.S. preference for a
fire alarm, that preference was decisive as a bargaining matter. As the
largest economy and the linchpin of the NAFTA enterprise, the United
States possessed significant power with regard to NAFTA. As
comparatively weak states deeply interested in accessing the U.S.
market, Canada and Mexico acquiesced to the U.S. demand for the
citizen submissions process because it was part of the price of securing
the overall NAFTA package.

46. Frederick W. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, in
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA'S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 97, 100 (Carolyn L.

Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002).
47. Personal communication from John Knox to author. John Knox was an NAAEC
negotiator for the U.S. Department of State. Id.
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But what precisely explains the content of U.S. preferences? Why
did the United States want to create a fire alarm in this particular
treaty-an unusual, even unprecedented feature in international
environmental law? Here, the negotiating history shows that the U.S.
government responded to a key interest group, which mobilized around
the newly-controversial trade-environment connection. On account of
the particular configuration of preferences in Congress and the U.S.
process of treaty ratification, this key interest group potentially had the
power to derail the domestic approval of the entire NAFTA package.
The bulk of the historical evidence demonstrates that the U.S.
government demanded both the negotiation of the NAAEC itself and
the inclusion of a fire alarm primarily to assuage critical domestic
interest groups that threatened the NAFTA bargain. Environmental
organizations were familiar with citizen suits in U.S. statutes and sought
a similar mechanizm in NAFTA. Since NAFTA was perceived to be a
close vote in Congress, the opposition of mainstream environmental
groups posed a credible threat to NAFTA's passage. 48 Moreover, these
groups were key campaign supporters of then President Clinton. As part
of his 1992 election campaign, Clinton had promised to make
environment and labor an integral part of the NAFTA negotiations.49
The NAAEC helped Clinton make good on that promise.
Environmentalists were motivated on the issue of the
environmental impact of international trade for two reasons. One was
the deteriorating state of the U.S.-Mexico border.5 0 Additionally, U.S.
environmental groups were highly motivated about trade agreements by
the then recent "tuna-dolphin" controversy. The controversy involved
U.S. restrictions on tuna caught in nets that also trapped dolphins.
Mexico successfully challenged the U.S. restrictions as a discriminatory
trade practice under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 51 The
incident significantly raised awareness among environmentalists of the
potential threats posed by international trade agreements, galvanizing

48. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: PoliticalLessons for the FTAA, supra note 46, at 106.
The U.S. Trade Representative had already been pressured into preparing a report on the
environmental issues. USTR, supra note 22.
49. JOHN MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE": NAFTA: WASHINGTON, AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 145-46 (2000).

. 50. Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law
After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 407-08 (2001).
51. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, DS21/R - 39S/155,
availableat www.wto.org (not adopted). See generally David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?:
The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001)
(discussing the tuna-dolphin dispute).
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activists to oppose new trade accords. The NAAEC was one of a
number of demands U.S. environmentalists made in exchange for their
political support of NAFTA.
Environmentalists thus "played a crucial role in helping to define
the U.S. bargaining position. ' 5 2 United States environmental groups
were ultimately split on the NAAEC as a "solution" to the
environmental threats posed by NAFTA. Nonetheless, enough major
groups came on board, including the World Wildlife Fund, the National
Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural
Resources Defense Council, to significantly ameliorate the threat to
NAFTA's passage in Congress. 53 Legislation implementing NAFTA
and the side agreements passed with more than 100 Democrats voting in
favor.54
The interest of U.S. environmental groups in a side agreement
containing a fire alarm is understandable. But as Frederick Mayer asks,
"how were a relatively small number of environmental groups able to
push the environment onto the agenda of an international trade
negotiation when none of the three countries intended initially to
conclude it?"' 55 The success of environmental groups was highly
dependent on the structure of U.S. institutions. Absent the constitutional
rules governing treaty approval in the United States, the political threat
posed by U.S. environmental groups would not have been credible. It is
true that Clinton had promised in his campaign to incorporate an
environmental side agreement into NAFTA. Yet once elected, Clinton
certainly could have reneged on that campaign promise-as he did on
several others. The key issue was the need for congressional approval,
without which NAFTA could not come into being. Even though
Congress passed NAFTA as a congressional-executive agreement,
rather than an Article II treaty,56 the executive branch still had to be
much more solicitous of domestic interest groups than would an

52. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, supra note 46, at 104.
53.

FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL

ANALYSIS 291 (1998).

54. Id. at 109.
55. Id.
56. See generally BRADLEY, supra note 11, at 409-21 (discussing congressional-executive
agreements). Article II treaties require the approval of two-thirds of the senators present and
voting; congressional-executive agreements require a simple majority of both houses of Congress.
Generally, the Article II process is considered to be more politically difficult, but that in turn
depends on the structure of partisan control. Id.
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executive in a Westminster-style parliamentary system or an
autocracy.57
In short, domestic institutions, in the form of specific
constitutional rules governing the treaty-making process, coupled with a
particular constellation of votes in the Congress, and a motivated and
powerful interest group, explain why the United States ultimately
sought the negotiation of an NAAEC with a relatively strong review
institution containing a fire alarm. To be sure, in the larger picture the
United States, as well as Canada and Mexico, was motivated by the
desire to realize joint gains through the entire NAFTA package. But the
particular aspect of NAFTA at issue here-the review provisions of the
NAAEC--cannot adequately be explained as an instance of rational
treaty design. The United States's power explains many aspects of
NAFTA, including why NAFTA has an environmental side
agreement.5 8 The content of U.S. preferences, however, can only be
understood by studying its enduring and idiosyncratic features: the
constitutional rules governing treaty approval and the U.S. political
process's permeability, on the one hand, and the numerous
environmentalist and free-trade resistant Democrats in Congress on the
other. This story is more complex than that proposed by rational design
theory, but far more accurate.
Later events bolster this liberal account. At the time of NAAEC
negotiation, few knew precisely what to expect of the citizen
submissions process. Now, as the impact has become clearer, the
NAFTA parties have sought to alter the NAAEC's fire alarm,
weakening it in various ways. 59 They can do so at the margin since
green groups' political leverage is now much lower. In 1999 and 2000,
the NAFTA parties held several closed meetings on the submissions6
0
process aimed at recasting some of the more troublesome provisions.
The resulting uproar, once the meetings became known, led to the

57. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES 1-21 (1984). An executive that is part of and emerges
from the party that controls parliament characterizes Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
Divided government is not possible. Id. In the period under consideration here, the U.S. Senate
and House were under Democratic control. President Clinton thus faced a situation of undivided
government. Nonetheless, NAFTA was a difficult vote for many Democratic legislators. The
groups most concerned about NAFTA's impact-unions and environmentalists-are traditional
Democratic constituencies. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA
supra note 46, at I11.
58. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and
WTO, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1997).
59. Markell, supra note 45, at 286.
60. See id.
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parties to back off temporarily. Instead they have used resolutions to
markedly circumscribe the ambit of a number of recently approved
factual records, in essence reducing the scope and thus the power of the
fire alarm process. 6 1 The parties can weaken the process significantly
because green groups' political leverage in the United States is now
much lower-NAFTA acts as a status quo rather than a proposal, and
the U.S. system in particular demonstrates a status quo bias.
In sum, liberal international relations theory better accounts for the
creation of the NAAEC Citizen Submissions Process. Liberal theory is
similar to rational design theory in that it is also rationalist in
orientation. Generally, rational design arguments in international
relations takes states as unitary actors, while liberal international
relations theory treat individuals (and groups) as the primary actors, and
understands state choices as a product of these actors' preferences
refracted through domestic institutions. The latter approach is more
consistent with the actual history of the NAAEC design.
The Citizen Submissions Process is unusual in its formal role for
private actors, but it is not unique. The World Bank Inspection Panel,
and even NAFTA's Chapter 11 investor protection provisions,
demonstrates the growing access private actors have within
international law. 62 Where the NAAEC is most distinctive is in its
substantive focus on domestic environmental law enforcement. By
providing private actors with a formalized role in the international
regulation of domestic enforcement, the NAAEC breaks new ground in
international environmental law. 63 The remainder of this Article
explores the advantages of fire alarm review in the NAFTAenvironment context.
B. The Advantages ofFireAlarms
Under the NAAEC submissions process, the CEC Secretariat, a
centralized body, prepares factual records. Private actors, however,

61. Id.
62. See generally Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, A Global Fifth Amendment? Nafta's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 41 (2003) ("Individual investors from one of the NAFTA
countries can seek to enforce the investor protections by initiating a claim against a host-country
government under Chapter I I's 'investor-state dispute mechanism'."); Sanford Gaines, Protecting
Investors, Protecting the Environment, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing
NAFTA Chapter 11).
63. See Wirth, supra note 13, at 781-83. Investor protection provisions in the NAFTA
provide even greater access. See Symposium: NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 183-252
(2001).
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trigger the search for treaty violations and initiation of the submissions
process. This fire alarm structure yields several important benefits-I
group these into three categories: efficiency, effectiveness, and
participatory benefits. The first two categories relate to the structure and
distribution of compliance-relevant information. The last advantage
relies on a particular normative vision of liberal democracy, which one
can defend directly or, more strategically, as a means to blunt
opposition to free trade expansion. There are also countervailing
disadvantages to the fire alarm approach, which is discussed later in this
Article.
C. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Enforcement is a perennial challenge in environmental regulation.
Difficulty in obtaining information about violations makes enforcement
difficult. 64 In theory, members of the CEC Secretariat could simply ask
governments about their enforcement patterns, or could even patrol
around the United States, Canada, and Mexico seeking to uncover
failures to effectively enforce domestic laws. By creating a fire alarm,
the NAAEC instead accesses private information about both legal
violations and enforcement efforts. This reliance on private information
is beneficial because of the structure of information in this issue area.
Information about environmental enforcement and its failure is often
widely diffused, in the sense that numerous actors may possess it,
though it may be costly to collect in many instances.
To be sure, governments often possess the best information about
their own enforcement efforts and those of related entities (such as
municipalities that share a watershed). Nonetheless, in their normal
activities private actors can discover instances of environmental
violations that governments may miss or may not choose to act upon.
They may also detect patterns of enforcement or nonenforcement that
government officials do not. The diffusion of information about
environmental enforcement is one reason citizen suit provisions and
private monitoring efforts-such as the many bay and river-keeper
organizations now popular in the U.S.-have been so successful in U.S.
65
environmental law.
While some NGOs and even some individuals may make special
efforts to search for and uncover enforcement failures for the express

64. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1226 (1998).
65. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 217-18.
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purpose of drafting a citizen submission, it is reasonable to assume that
at least some of these search efforts would occur in the absence of the
NAAEC process. Private parties may search for relevant information on
environmental enforcement for economic reasons, such as a firm
concerned about competitors. Information can also arise as the byproduct of other activities, rather than as the product of an explicit
search. For example, those who live near or fish on a river directly
observe water quality, fish catches, development changes, and the like
while engaging in their normal routines. Particular domestic statutes
may further enhance the diffusion of environmental information. For
example, the U.S. Clean Water Act, which, by allowing individuals to
access information relevant to enforcement, is explicitly information
forcing.6 6 In short, the structure of information about environmental
enforcement is one in which information is relatively dispersed and is
sometimes a collateral benefit of other, exogenous activities that private
actors engage in. A fire alarm provides a pathway for this wealth of
private information to flow to decision-makers.
Even for completely additional private search efforts (searches that
would not have occurred but for the NAAEC), centralized international
authorities, such as the CEC Secretariat, will not always provide lowercost information. Private actors may have the ability to discover
relevant information about environmental enforcement at a lower cost
67
than official actors because of proximity or because of specialization.
By proximity I mean that individuals and NGOs reside in places and
This is particularly true for
situations where violations occur.
environmental violations. This proximity to environmental sites (e.g. a
protected forest or a hazardous waste dump) should permit these actors
to readily discover at least some types of enforcement failures. By
specialization I mean that some private actors focus on the issue of
monitoring environmental amenities and enforcement. A good example
is a private actor such as a bay-keeper.
This view of private actors as possessors of significant
compliance-relevant information is not novel. As Professor Steven
Shavell argues:
[I]t is often true that potential or actual victims of harm or third
parties are easily able to identify those to whom the law should

66. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
67. While governments may discern patterns of enforcement more readily than can private
actors, even this claim is not always true: some private groups, such as the Sierra Club, can
marshal considerable resources across many jurisdictions.
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apply. If so, then it is socially desirable for such parties with
information relevant for enforcement to supply it to a social
authority, rather than68 have the state spend its resources on
enforcement activity."

A recent overview of the literature on environmental enforcement
concurs, adding:
There are several reasons why governments might [create citizen suit
provisions]. Private. citizens who are directly affected by pollution
might be better situated to detect environmental violations in their
neighborhoods and can be a good judge of whether or not69 they are
concerned enough about this pollution to take some action.

The dispersed nature of environmental information is one reason
private attorney general
provisions have been so successful in U.S.
70
environmental law.
Reasonable persons may quibble over whether private actors
actually possess better information about environmental compliance
than do government actors. But at a minimum, private actors are clearly
privy to different information than governments. Again, it is important
to underscore that governments possess significant information about
enforcement failures, and will be motivated to act on that information
under some conditions. I claim only that private actors possess relevant
information as well, and sometimes possess information that
governments do not, and perhaps can only acquire at a high cost.
Possessing information, however, is not the same as revealing it.
What are the incentives for private actors to reveal information-in
other words, to pull the fire alarm? Some private actors will face
economic incentives to reveal relevant information. For example,
shellfish harvesters working in an estuary have an economic incentive
to reveal information about illegal water discharges from an upstream
factory; so do rule-compliant competitor factories. Hikers and boaters
similarly have incentives to reveal relevant information because of the
potential harm to their leisure activities. Environmental NGOs, which
often specialize in such monitoring, are organizationally motivated to
reveal information they possess. Collective action problems will surely
restrict the gathering and revelation of information, but there is no
68.

Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 267

(1993).
69. Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental
Monitoring andEnforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245, 10249 (2000).
70. See Thompson, supra note 12 (discussing the monitoring and informant roles of private
citizens and NGOs in the citizen suit context in U.S. environmental law).
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reason to think such dilemmas will completely stem the flow of
information.71
Consequently, in the context of environmental protection, this
analysis suggests that a treaty review institution incorporating a fire
alarm may be more efficient than a pure police patrol system in at least
two ways. First, the fire alarm taps into information already possessed
by private actors, and therefore entails no or low additional search costs.
Second, a fire alarm capitalizes on the ability of low-cost private
information providers to uncover new, additional compliance-relevant
information. The question of whether a fire alarm or police patrol is
more efficient in a given treaty turns on the relative marginal cost of
government actors supplying the information private actors possess or
obtain as a by-product of their normal activities. The relative efficiency
calculus is complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Here, I claim
only that there is a plausible theoretical case that fire alarms are
relatively more efficient than police patrols in uncovering
environmental enforcement failures. It is important to underscore that I
am not arguing that fire alarms are efficient in the sense of yielding the
optimal amount of enforcement. In fact, as I discuss below, fire alarms
may be structurally disposed to not yield the optimal amount of
enforcement.
From a social welfare perspective, fire alarms can create a
collective cost savings: more violations uncovered for the same
aggregate expenditure. But fire alarms may also be cost-saving from an
individual state perspective. Fire alarms transfer search costs offbudget. While states must collectively supply the institutional structure
of the "alarm" (in the NAAEC, the unit in the CEC Secretariat that
receives citizen submissions), and must bear the costs of responding to
alarms (the expense of responding to submissions and preparing factual
records), the direct costs of discovering enforcement failures are borne
by private actors. The costs of translating facts into legal claims and the
preparation of a submission that alleges enforcement failures are also
borne by the submitters.
Finally, the same structure of information-wide dispersal among
many private actors-that I suggest may make fire alarms efficient, in a
cost-per-violation-detected sense in the NAAEC context, is also likely

71. Indeed, the environmental movement itself is a testament to the capacity of actors to
overcome, at least intermittently, even severe collective action problems.
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to make them more effective than pure reliance on police patrols.7 2 All
else equal, fire alarm systems can be much more comprehensive than
police patrols. As Professors McCubbins and Schwartz argue, fire
alarms involve private actors who can cover more territory than
centralized authorities.7 3 Centralized agencies engaged in police patrol
monitoring inevitably spend considerable time monitoring actions,
actors, and places which do not yield violations; in other words, they
engage in wasted search efforts. Fire alarms minimize the likelihood of
wasted search efforts.74 Private actors do not incur the substantial search
costs that centralized monitors do because their information is often a
by-product of other activities. Additionally, they are able to monitor a
wide range of government enforcement efforts, a much wider range than
even a tremendously expanded CEC Secretariat.
The wasteful search effort problem is rendered more complex
when one considers that police patrols, even when they fail to uncover
violations, have deterrent value. Consequently, police patrols yield
some benefits even when they fail to uncover violations. Similarly, the
threat of private actors pulling fire alarms also has deterrent value. The
key question, is under what conditions is the deterrence produced by
one model more effective, or cheaper, than that of the other model? One
plausible hypothesis is that the deterrent value of a police patrol is likely
highest where noncompliant actors can escape attention and/or readily
hide the evidence of their malfeasance ex post. This is consistent with
the fact that real police typically patrol for crime rather than merely
responding to calls. By contrast, fire departments do not generally patrol
because fires do not run away or burn out without a trace. The relevant
information about fires is physically fixed. Because the failures to
enforce environmental laws that are at issue in the NAAEC are often
ongoing,75 and because these failures are readily documented and the
actors relatively easily identified, the relevant information is better
thought of as fixed rather than mobile. If this analysis is correct, it
suggests that (in the context of the NAAEC) fire alarms are likely to be
more effective at the margin than are police patrols.

72. Effectiveness here refers to the ability to meet the goal of deterring and redressing
violation.
73. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 165.
74. Id. at 168.
75. See Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is
Warranted, BC Mining, A14/SEM/98-004/10/ADV (CEC May 11, 2001) (SEM-98-004),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF11 .PDF, (noting the inherent temporal element
to the legal standard of failing to effectively enforce).
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D. EnhancingParticipation in InternationalLaw
When employed in international treaties fire alarms can also
provide greater legitimacy and perceived political accountability than
pure police patrols. Indeed, this may be their most important impact. In
contemporary debates over global governance and international
institutions, critics have focused on accountability and public
participation. As international institutions have increasingly encroached
on traditionally domestic policy spheres, many individuals have
questioned their democratic pedigree and lack of access for the public.
The NAAEC submissions process is a partial response to these
critiques. Private actors concerned about environmental protection now
need not rely solely on domestic law to ensure that environmental laws
are adequately enforced. The Citizen Submissions Process thus
enhances political responsiveness, and this enhancement goes beyond
NAFTA's potential impact on environmental enforcement. Submitters
need not prove or even allege that an enforcement failure has resulted
from NAFTA.7 6 Any failure to effectively enforce environmental laws,
whether putatively NAFTA-driven or not, is a permissible focus of a
submission under the NAAEC.
The use of a fire alarm may also enhance the legitimacy of the
NAAEC by enhancing public participation. Citizen participation is a
mantra of many advocates of good global governance. It is also a central
component of contemporary administrative law in the United States, the
chief architect of the NAAEC.7 7 A key facet of fire alarms is that they
permit individuals to direct the substantive caseload of the review
institution-a potentially critical and influential role. By engaging in the
citizen submissions process, private actors can at the margin both
influence the actions of the Secretariat and of the parties. To be sure,
this influence is not large: many critics of the NAAEC procedure argue
that it lacks teeth, addresses peripheral issues, and creates obstacles to
effective participation.7 8 But for all its weaknesses, the NAAEC is an
important step in the democratization of international environmental
law. However small the current scope for citizen participation in the
NAAEC, it is a major advance over most environmental treaties, in

76. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1483.
77. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1667, 1760 (1975); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 543, 592 (2000).
78. Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process under NAFTA's Environmental Side
Agreement: It's Easy to Use, But Does It Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10031, 10034 (1996).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 26:389

which direct public participation is nonexistent. This advance in
participation is both normatively preferable on its own terms, as well as
instrumentally useful from the perspective of gaining support for
economic liberalization. As NAFTA history illustrates, the negotiation
of the NAAEC substantially smoothed NAFTA's prospects within a key
domestic interest group.
E. The DisadvantagesofFireAlarms

Fire alarms are not a panacea. The disadvantages and advantages
of fire alarm systems are closely related. This Article emphasizes that
structure of information is an important determinant of whether a fire
alarm is likely to be effective as a tool of treaty review in a particular
case. I hypothesized that fire alarms are ill suited to situations where
information is not widely dispersed among many actors or where
information is not "fixed": where violators can readily hide evidence or
move quickly. That is one reason fire alarms are unlikely to be effective
in a treaty such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, whose aim is the
hidden development of chemical weapons by governments.
Other serious shortcomings exist. Decentralized citizen
participation, because it is fundamentally driven by disconnected
individual choices, can entail unfocused, reactive compliance
management. Fire alarms may also systematically skew responses by
centralized review bodies because actors with particularistic preferences
monopolize the fire alarms.79 Ultimately, the fire alarm model depends
crucially on the interests and behavior of private actors. These interests
may be particularistic and/or promote goals that are not in the collective
interest of the broader cooperative community. Fire alarms, by
definition, delegate the power to trigger investigations to private actors.
This delegation entails a loss of autonomy and control, sometimes
referred to as "sovereignty costs." 80 Such delegation "introduces new
actors and new forms of politics into interstate relations ... actors with

delegated legal authority have their own interests, the pursuit of which

79. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 74-75 (1997) (discussing citizen suits and shifting agency policy choices). One might
view this as a variant on capture. Here, a special interest(s) captures a process which centralized
bureaucrats administer.
80. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT'L ORG. 421,436-37 (2000).
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may be more or less successfully constrained by conditions on
81 the grant
of authority and concomitant surveillance by member states."
This is one reason that citizen triggered fire alarms have been
avoided in the World Trade Organization, despite repeated calls for
access by private actors. Since trade liberalization entails so many
particularized economic interests, the state must engage in a large
degree of interest aggregation. Permitting individuals to bring claims
directly would disrupt the often delicate political balances that trade
liberalization demands. In addition, fire alarms may pressure
governments to enforce the law beyond optimal levels. This issue goes
beyond the reflexive sovereignty costs that governments fear. Even
when governments welcome public oversight in principle, enforcement
is not free. The fire alarm driven diversion of funds toward particular
enforcement efforts, enforcement that the government has explicitly or
implicitly chosen to ignore, risks misallocating scarce resources. In
sum, providing private actors with a means to pressure officials creates
risks of both overenforcement and poorly targeted enforcement.
Fire alarms may also yield underenforcement. Procedure is the
primary throttle on the fire alarms use, and procedures can be
incorrectly set. The cost-benefit ratio for potential users is critical; if the
benefit gained from pulling the fire alarm is too low relative to the costs
of doing so, the system will not work optimally. Many commentators
have argued that the NAAEC submissions process, resulting in at best
the release of a factual record, is too weak to make a meaningful
difference in behavior.8 2 This weakness may undermine the system's
effectiveness both for submissions brought and submissions not
brought. In other words, the remedy's weakness, in conjunction with the
cost of preparing a submission, may discourage otherwise worthy
submissions.
This issue of underenforcement is worth a brief detour. The
relative weakness of the remedy in the NAAEC suggests one possible
interpretation of the low number of citizen submissions so far. As of
February 2004, forty-seven submissions in ten years, with ten factual
records finalized.83 There is no objective way to determine whether this

81. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD
POLITICS 17, 34 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). While focused on the delegation to courts or
other international bodies, this statement applies equally well to private actors empowered with
the legal right to bring a claim. Id.
82. Tutchton, supra note 78, at 10031.
83. Current Status of Filed Submissions, www.cec.org/citizen/index.cfn?varlan=english
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
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is a high or a low number. But I would submit that, given the size and
population of North America, this is not a high figure. The preceding
analysis also suggests an explanation for the great disparity in the
number of challenges to each NAFTA state. On a per capita basis,
complaints against Canada are more than 1400 percent higher and
complaints against Mexico more than 700 percent higher than
complaints against the United States.8 4 The United States, with nearly
ten times the population of Canada, has had fewer submissions filed
against it than Canada has even in absolute terms.
One plausible explanation for this marked disparity is differences
in domestic remedies across North America. Domestic measures
obviously act as substitutes for the Citizen Submissions Process, and are
often more attractive because they are more comprehensive and involve
stronger remedies. Since the U.S. legal system provides a wealth of
access for aggrieved citizens, in particular via the many citizen suit
provisions contained in environmental statutes, the disparity in citizen
submissions probably reflects the existence of better alternatives in U.S.
domestic law. 85 The interesting question, still unanswered, is why
Canada has a much higher per capita rate of submissions than does
Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION

Review institutions play an important role in promoting treaty
implementation, monitoring performance, and ensuring that states
comply with their treaty obligations. The NAAEC Citizen Submissions
Process is one example of a growing set of treaty review institutions.
The police patrol and fire alarm dichotomy, used here to delineate two
models of treaty review, helps to illuminate the core of the NAAEC
procedure and to underscore its distinctive features.
I have argued that there are compelling deductive reasons to
believe that fire alarm review institutions have some efficiency,
effectiveness, and normative advantages in the context of North
American environmental cooperation. These advantages largely flow
from the fact that information about environmental enforcement and
environmental violations is widely dispersed. These advantages are not

84. Knox, supra note 40, at 105-06.
85. See id. at 107-08 (noting that "while potential submitters may see environmental
remedies under U.S. law (and, to a lesser degree, Canadian law) as so effective that the Citizen
Submissions Process can add little to them, the procedure may offer avenues for relief otherwise
unavailable to potential submitters concerned with Mexican environmental issues.").
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overwhelming, but they are significant. I have also argued, however,
that there is little evidence that the NAAEC submissions process was
created in a functional manner, to capture these benefits explicitly.
Rather, the causal relationship is more indirect: powerful environmental
interests in the United States demanded the NAAEC Citizen
Submissions Process as a tool and a political statement, and their
leverage in the NAFTA debate led to its negotiation.
Critics have disparaged the Citizen Submissions Process for its
weaknesses, in particular with regard to the outcome-a factual record,
rather than a legal ruling or authoritative recommendation.
Strengthening the remedy would likely increase the number of
submissions. At the moment, however, the United States, Canada, and
Mexico seem more inclined to weaken the procedure than to strengthen
it. Nonetheless, when viewed against the backdrop of other international
environmental treaties, the NAAEC, by further involving private actors
in public regulation, represents an innovative step in the design of
international institutions.

